Community after all? An inside perspective of encampment in Haiti by Corbet, Alice
HAL Id: hal-02338808
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02338808
Submitted on 6 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Community after all? An inside perspective of
encampment in Haiti
Alice Corbet
To cite this version:
Alice Corbet. Community after all? An inside perspective of encampment in Haiti. Journal of Refugee
Studies, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2016, What is a camp? Explorations of the limits and effects
of the camp, 29 (2), pp.166-186. ￿10.1093/jrs/fev022￿. ￿hal-02338808￿
1 
 
Alice Corbet 
Community after all? An inside perspective on encampment in Haiti 
 
Summary: 
This article demonstrates the limits of the camp as a place to live from the point of view of 
displaced people: what is a camp for those who live inside? Why not envisage the camps as central 
place, where life is going on with, or without, the humanitarian help? It studies the differences 
between two different settlements created after the 2010 earthquake. One has been formally set-up 
by NGOs but has ended up being abandoned by the humanitarian organizations due to troubles with 
the inhabitants. The other is a spontaneous settlement that has absorbed populations from other 
camps, and is today in a working condition organised informally by inhabitants themselves. In the first 
case, experiences of community and belonging of the post-earthquake population seems have been 
frustrated; in the second case, these sentiments could be an explanation of the informal forward 
projection. Thus, they pass from a liminal statement to a central perception. The monographic 
approach permits to understand the dynamics and the identitarian background of the installation in 
the camps. 
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Community after all? An inside perspective on encampment in Haiti 
 
Grasping the borders of encampment and settlement in Haiti from the 
inside 
 
 
Starting and ending encampment 
 
Three years after the earthquake that hit Haiti on January 12, 2010, at least 347,284 displaced 
people were still living in 450 camps, of which 337 are on private land, according to the UN 
Emergency Shelter and Camp Management Cluster (DTM 2013). The continued presence of people in 
camps points to the importance of the encampment process, whereby the move to set up camps is 
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associated with a political logic: a logic that controls human life (Verdirame, Harrell Bond 2005). The 
end point of encampment can vary but there is one which is of particular interest to us here: that is a 
shift from a camp to a settlement. How do displaced people modify the place where they live, do they 
have the support of the ‘humanitarian apparatus’ –the fluid humanitarian discourses and practices-, 
to borrow the term first used by Foucault (Pandolfi 2003)? This article’s ethnographic approach uses 
monographic observation1 in order to gain insight into the displaced persons’ feelings and 
perceptions, as well as to take stock of any investments they make in their environment –the camp– 
and in the humanitarian relationship. It allows us to reverse the gaze towards the humanitarian 
apparatus and to explore how NGOs are operating from the camps’ inside point of view: the one of 
the camp residents. 
This article will focus on two different camps whose evolution have been followed between 
2010 and 2013. The profile of the Haitians camps is very diverse. Some benefit from the assistance of 
various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and are highly structured, offering the prospect that 
the displaced people living there may become permanently established on the spot: these are the 
‘formal’ or ‘regulated’ camps. But in other cases, the ‘spontaneous’ or ‘informal’ camps may infringe 
the property rights of the land where they are located, and as the NGOs’ resources run out, the 
poorest are thrown back to their usual means of survival: fending for themselves (‘demele’ in Creole). 
This article will compare two adjacent Haitian camps located to the north of the capital, Port-au-
Prince: Corail, a formal camp, and Canaan, an informal one. It will demonstrate the limits of the camp 
as a place to live in from the point of view of displaced people: what is a camp for those who live 
inside? How can we determine whether it is a place to take refuge, or a place to create a new frame 
of life?I will show that camps can be envisaged as central places that integrate in the urban life the 
ones who have been excluded by poverty and the damage caused by the earthquake. 
When the camps were first created, despite their differences, Corail and Canaan were both 
‘floating spaces’, uncertain places called heterotopia by Foucault (2009:36): ‘other spaces’, where 
people are pushed aside. But unlike the humanitarian apparatus of the formal camp, the actions of 
the inhabitants in Canaan are guided by an informal logic. This observation raises questions about the 
                                                 
1
 This article is the product of three fieldwork sessions of five weeks each carried out between 2011 and 2013 in 
Port-au-Prince, conducted independently alongside consultancy work for Groupe URD and the Delegation fort 
Strategic Affairs (DAS) of the French Defence Ministry. More than 60 informal and semi-informal interviews 
have been done in Port-au-Prince agglomeration, mostly with displaced people (at least 30 of them in Camp 
Mosaique and Canaan) and NGOs actors (6 people). The languages used were Haitian Creole and French. 
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camp’s social and urban limits and contributes to regarding its political and urban nature, and even 
about its very identity. 
Thus, this article stresses how the different logics of encampment and ending camps have 
interacted, and even entered into competition. First of all, it presents the general context in Haiti and 
describes the humanitarian apparatus with respect to camps. It then goes on to analyze how the 
‘formal camp’ of Corail escaped the NGOs’ humanitarian apparatus, prompting their departure when 
they thought it becoming unmanageable, and then how it has started to merge with Canaan, its 
neighbour. Canaan’s informality has gone hand in hand with forms of solidarity that allow individual 
survival because of the survival of the group, and which run in parallel with individual strategies. The 
case of the little informal Mosaique Camp is used to illustrate how this situation allowed new groups 
of displaced people to be integrated into the site, after which the settlement dynamics at work in 
Canaan are analyzed. The conclusion emphasises the identity and political dimension of the camp. In 
contrast with Corail, elements of what it could be called a ‘community of condition’ underlie Canaan’s 
functioning, even though the camp is invisible to the government and NGOs precisely because of its 
informality, which makes it fall outside the legal framework. I will explain that this ‘community of 
condition’ is made by inhabitants who start with nothing, like “naked people” (Agamben 2003), but 
not without resources: this is their way to solve their lives in precarious conditions. 
 
A disaster in a weak country 
 
Haiti has distinguished itself as the world’s first independent ‘black´ republic, which arose 
from a slave revolt in 1804.It has gone from being the number one tourist destination in the 
Caribbean in the 1960s to one drained by successive dictatorships and recurring natural disasters. 
According to pre-earthquake figures from 2003, 76% of Haitians live below the daily poverty line of 
US$2, while 55% live beneath the absolute poverty line of US$1 per day (UNDP 2004). The livelihoods 
of the vast majority of the population are based on the economics of day-to-day survival, where each 
person must invent a way to find the food they will eat that same evening (De Certeau 1990). In these 
circumstances, unpredictability is the rule, precariousness the norm. And consequently to the 
structural weakness of the country and instability of the state, this vast and pliable mass of excluded 
people provides an adjustable variable for Haiti’s failing economy and enables the country to 
function: informality is the way to survive for the majority of the Haitians. Yet numerous charitable, 
religious, medical or development organisations support the people of Haiti. The United Nations is 
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present in the country since 2004 through the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, better 
known as MINUSTAH, whose mandate has been extended following the 12 January 2010 earthquake. 
The 2010 earthquake, the centre of which was located close to the metropolitan area of Port-
au-Prince, was responsible for the death of tens of thousands of people (the numbers of the dead 
varies from 80 000 to 360 000 (Corbet 2012), the destruction of buildings with the loss of many 
documents, and the displacement of more than 2 million people. It also led to the proliferation of 
external aid, which has proved difficult to channel and coordinate. The 1500 camps that sprung up in 
few days in January 2010 were gradually organized by their residents or through the actions of NGOs 
which distributed water, food and tarpaulins, installed latrines, ran health clinics, etc. Many of their 
inhabitants were granted internally displaced person (IDP) status, thereby giving them rights (DTM 
2013). 
Initially, most of the inhabitants of the camps were people who had lost their homes, but the 
presence of humanitarian aid and the prospect of access to land in the city centre attracted certain 
people from very poor areas who sometimes moved from shantytowns neglected by the Haitian state 
to camps managed by international agencies. Some people living outside the capital were also 
attracted by the new urban neighbourhoods that grew out of the earthquake, continuing the trend 
towards urban drift that has gone hand-in-hand with the gradual impoverishment of Haiti’s rural 
areas (Paul, Dameus, Garrabe 2010; Oliver-Smith 2010). Nonetheless, as the months went by, 
humanitarian aid progressively dried up, and only those who had no other option were left in the 
camps, where the living conditions steadily deteriorated, particularly during the rainy season and with 
the arrival of cholera towards the end of 2010. At the time of my last fieldwork, in 2013, a mixture of 
very poor people and of those who had lost everything remained in the camps, benefiting from 
humanitarian aid to a greater or lesser extent, according to where they lived. 
 
Corail Camp: the humanitarian imposition  
 
Building a camp in the desert 
 
Corail is located 15 kilometres north of Port-au-Prince, in area that is virtually desert area. The 
camp opened in April 2010 and has two parts, Corail Cesselesse and Corail Sector 3, spread over 
approximately 25 hectares. In the space of a few days it received as many as 10,000 people from 
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camps that had reached saturation point in the centre of the city, including the Petion-Ville Golf Club, 
an up-market area located in the hills above Port-au-Prince. 
The camp was created at the request of the United States army, in spite of the reluctance of 
the Haitian government and many NGOs, who questioned the appropriateness of creating a camp on 
that particular spot (World Vision 2011; Katz, AP 2010). As well as its distance from the capital and its 
very arid climate, the district is liable to flooding in the rainy season. Moreover, the area, which had 
previously been known as Titanyen, was a place renowned for summary executions during the 
dictatorship of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier. It was also the spot where, for practical reasons, 
the communal graves that were dug following the earthquake are located. We'll see how the setting 
up of Corail in this area has caused many problems, like the end of the camp and a stalemate 
situation for its inhabitants. 
Corail was put together in a very rational way, and administered by various NGOs with 
responsibility for its management with the aim of meeting emergency needs as best they could. Its 
design followed the very precise recommendations contained in camp management toolkits, which 
specify the best way to build and administer camps based on functional criteria: dividing the camp 
into blocks, assessment on the basis of a ‘typical’ family of the number of square meters for each 
home, of litres of water per person, number of latrines, etc (UNHCR 2007; UNDP/IAPSO 2009). Was it 
intended to offer a site for temporary shelter, or to create a model town based on the assumption of 
a ‘community’ created by the encampment, as was suggested by several officials, including 
PresidentPréval, who stated that in Corail, ‘roads and infrastructure will be built, like a real 
community’ (Haiti Libre 2010)? 
The “toolkit” design of Corail is the same as in other formal camps, but is more evidently 
visible because the camp is far from the city. Its management, only focused on the body needs, has 
resulted in a camp that soon gave its inhabitants the impression that they were being subjected to 
encampment by an external supervision rather than being assisted along the road to reconstruction. 
Indeed, protests soon arose regarding the provision of aid and the difficulties associated with life in 
such a hostile location. When a storm devastated Corail in July 2010, the first rumblings of discontent 
were heard: ‘A few people in charge of NGOs present when it all began quickly left in order to save 
their skins –a fact that was not appreciated by the victims. “It’s obvious that they’ve sent us here to 
die”, they said bitterly with regard to the Government and NGOs’ (Le Nouvelliste 2010). The camp’s 
isolation cut its inhabitants off from work opportunities available on the informal urban market, 
making them dependent on humanitarian hand-outs. When payment for cleaning latrines was halted 
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in summer 2010, there was further tension. For one NGO head ‘paying for basic maintenance risks 
damaging people’s self-respect […]. Security and cleaning need to be taken care of free of charge and 
voluntarily in order to consolidate a sense of community’. This view –not applied in other camps– 
called into question the very meaning of the intervention: how can an organisation ‘expect people 
who are hungry to work for free?’ asked another camp administrator (Haiti Libre 2010)? 
In this tense atmosphere, certain leaders adopted a classic strategy for gaining power in a 
humanitarian context and became influential in Corail thanks to their ability to interact with NGOs 
and the world of the blan (‘foreigner’ in Creole). Those who spoke English or French, who understood 
the humanitarian apparatus and who knew how to respond to its expectations –those who have 
social capital and agency- were particularly successful. Indeed, all the leaders that I have interviewed 
were in a position of authority before they arrived in the camp, either through religious, economic, 
charismatic, or violent influences. Even though they were not always camp residents and were not 
genuinely representative of the population, these leaders were accepted by the inhabitants, who saw 
in them the only way to be heard (Harrell Bond, Voutira 2007). Some of them have sometimes even 
exacerbated problems, or have over-victimised the displaced, playing up to the clichéd image of 
passive displaced people in order to demand more aid (Napier-Moore 2005: 13). 
These intermediaries, known as ‘community leaders/mobilizers/managers’ in the 
humanitarian jargon, were also watched by the displaced people since their interaction with the 
world of the blan meant that they were suspected of making personal gain from their collaboration 
rather than working for the collective benefit, and particularly of siphoning off money and goods. It is 
true that these leaders often had an interest in finding work and earning social prestige. That is why 
other displaced persons, labelled as ‘troublemakers’ by the NGOs, set themselves up in opposition to 
them, making it even harder for outside bodies to understand Corail’s internal dynamics. There was 
therefore a quick subjectification of some of the IDPs, who adopted personal and often opportunistic 
tactics to succeed and increased the differentiations and divisions within the camp. This, in time, 
allowed the population of Corail to come together around two main concerns: either cooperation 
with NGOs, or opposition to them. 
At the same time, transitional shelters were built to replace the earlier hurricane-resistant 
tents. These T-shelters, which are made of imported wood and have a life span of 3 – 5 years if they 
are well maintained, were initially rejected by the IDPs because they were considered too small and 
because they confirmed the half-temporary, half-permanent status of their presence in Corail. 
Nonetheless, the camp has gradually become transformed into a ‘village’ made up of thousands of 
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shelters laid out in straight lines, like other urban camps that have been earmarked as transitional 
sites (Salome 2012). 
  
When camp residents oppose the camp and their designated community  
 
Generally speaking, the exclusion of the inhabitants from projects intended for their benefit 
and the uncertainty over the camp’s future strengthened the dependent power relationship on the 
humanitarian institutions that IDPs already had to put up due to the precariousness of their situation. 
The complete break in the humanitarian relationship was prompted by the increasing gulf between 
the humanitarian apparatus and IDPs, when an NGO attempted to establish a micro-business 
programme in Corail. Rumours, spread by ‘troublemakers’ among a population predisposed to 
consider ‘humanitarians’ as being responsible for their difficulties for the reasons exposed before, 
grew up around the way that the beneficiaries of financial support had been selected. They said 
mostly that there was partiality. Demonstrations bringing together several hundred IDPs took place in 
Petion-Ville in April 2012. They were very well organised: buses were hired to transport the 
demonstrators, suggesting that Corail had been used to further one side in the Haitian political 
debate and disagreements about the massive presence of the international community. The camp 
managers and their NGOs interpreted these demonstrations as a betrayal and, since they could no 
longer control Corail or ensure the security of humanitarian personnel, who were sometimes 
threatened, they withdrew from the camp in the summer of 2012. 
The IDPs - who, above all, wanted greater clarity about the NGOs’ programmes, pointing to 
their lack of coherence and unfairness - were able to be manipulated to the point where they 
completely rejected the humanitarian intervention. Yet they felt that the NGOs had abandoned them 
and were punishing them because they had not been ‘good beneficiaries’. Since then, Corail has 
existed without any regular supply of treated water to prevent cholera, even if treated water is one of 
the major preoccupation of the NGOs, and a way to identify which are the camps helped by them 
(formal camps) and which are the other informal camps! Then, people buy water in small quantities, 
making it more expensive as well as being time-consuming and incurring a high social cost, so that 
some people end up using untreated water. What is more, the latrines have been closed down. 
At the time of the Corail revolt, the supposed community of displaced people exploded simply 
because it never existed: Haitian society is highly fragmented (Corbet, Groupe URD 2012), and IDPs 
are divided up into small family groups coming from various walks of life. That is why Corail has 
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created multiple forms of resistance and its inhabitants rebelled against the only community that 
existed for them: the unspecified international community, so undefined in a theoretical sense 
(Lachmann 2011) but so poignantly concrete for Haitians, and which they sometimes describe as 
‘disguised occupation’. Moreover, by seeking to help the other in a biopolitical mode (Foucault 2004), 
the humanitarian intervention in Corail paradoxically reduced these same people to a passive form of 
existence. Via the status of ‘beneficiary’ that is intrinsic to being an IDP, the international community 
put the displaced population in the collective position of being a needy community so that the 
emergence of individual subjectivities, political claims, and even the manipulation of IDPs living in 
camps, were either ignored or were seen as an attack on humanitarianism (same similar cases have 
been studied by Nyers 2006, Agier 2010). 
Events in Corail therefore confirm the existence of external humanitarian actors’ 
assumptions, as well as the inflexibility of the heads of the humanitarian apparatus and the dynamics 
of confrontation that they provoke. As Turner indicates (2014), “a main assumption in community 
development and capacity building projects is that ‘real’ refugees are non-political. (…) The projects 
assume that once the refugees are empowered or given voice, they will act in the (objective) interest 
of ‘the community’”. Thus, “ignoring power and politics, relief agencies are ignorant of what actually 
goes on in the camps”. In this space of alienation, Turner concludes, “every action and every 
interpretation is political, so paradoxically it is the depoliticisation that creates the politicisation”. 
The IDPs’ revolt reveals the malfunctioning of the humanitarian apparatus which, by assigning 
the label ‘community’ to a camp, creates a totalitarian illusion that echoes Agamben’s (2003) ideas: 
that of a space managed in a rigid and authoritarian way. The case of CoraiI demonstrates, however, 
that IDPs are not crushed by absolute power over bare life. Agamben’s space of exception - a 
paradigm of absolute power exerted over life itself - rapidly enters into confrontation with social 
evolution. The exception is of more significance to humanitarians than to displaced people 
themselves, thereby creating points of friction. A camp’s day-to-day ‘care and maintenance’ intended 
to manage IDPs’ basic needs is incompatible with the life that is created there and with local 
dynamics (Turner, 2005, p.313). It even runs counter to Haitian-style day-to-day fending for oneself 
since it prevents flexibility, and instead imposes administrative rigidity. Yet life in the camp is as much 
about displacement as emplacement (Agier 2002b). Since the NGOs left, most of the IDPs have rented 
out or resold their T-shelters, or adapted them and planted trees. Some of them have started 
restaurants and small shops in the vicinity of the camp. Others have organised tap-tap routes –public 
transport– from the camp entrance into the greater Port-au-Prince area. 
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The case of Corail is an example of a camp whose planning forgot social dynamics. It shows 
how a humanitarian perspective, that ignores displaced people as social and political subjects, is at 
odds with their aspirations. Humanitarian principles are applied at the expense of the social context: 
as if displaced people, just like the camp itself, are a-historic. This approach has deprived Corail’s IDPs 
of their life histories, their networks, and their ability to participate or to resist. It has been reinforced 
by the purely technical –even hygienic– approach to camp management that is based on the fusion of 
political and biological life and on the legitimisation of rights in the name of the suffering body. In 
other words, displaced people’s biolegitimacy (the legitimacy based on the body, Fassin 2000), 
granted by their IDP status, has taken precedence over social adaptability. Thus, while the various 
toolkits used to organise Corail are supposed to alleviate suffering during the emergency period, their 
lack of flexibility and humanity resembles a form of external control over the precariousness of 
human existence which fails to ensure the camp’s transition in such a way that its inhabitants can 
rebuild more normal, autonomous and dignified ways of life. 
Since the NGOs left, Corail’s IDPs have been trapped in a dead-end: that of a camp no one 
knows what to do with. As in the refugee camps where there is no possible return and where the 
temporary turns into an eternity, there is no way out of the camp and its inhabitants remain in a 
precarious state of endless encampment. The T-shelters have now started to disintegrate, yet there is 
still no long-term rehousing solution for the IDPs. Although responsibility for the camp has been 
passed on to the local commune of Croix-des-Bouquets, President Michel Martelly’s government, 
elected in 2011, continues to deliberately neglect the camp that was created by his predecessor. 
Corail’s displaced population therefore hesitates either to set up home there permanently or to leave 
for another place where they can have more influence on their destiny, as if they were closed-in 
spatially and morally in a temporary ‘camp shape’ with no one knowing what will become of it. In 
order to open up the possibility of something other than just waiting, they use various strategies to 
interact with the neighbouring site of Canaan. For instance, families split up, some keeping the Corail 
T-shelter, while others go to reserve a space in Canaan. Whereas previously they looked to the urban 
centre of Port-au-Prince, they now see their informal neighbour as a unit that might offer them a 
livelihood. In this way, the IDPs try to make the most of the advantages offered by both sites. 
Observation shows that in some formal camps, the unity shaped by the experience of joining a camp 
stops functioning. The IDPs are then attracted by the near-by informal camp, whose cohesion –which 
we will subsequently refer to as the ‘community of condition’– allows life projects to be successfully 
carried out. 
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Canaan, a vast but ‘invisible’ camp  
 
The informal organisation of encampment 
 
Some of the first inhabitants of Canaan explained to me how they arrived in the area. In 
January 2010, the vast area around Corail was still virtually uninhabited, but following the devastation 
caused by the earthquake, a few displaced people moved there due to the lack of space in the city. 
They were joined there by hundreds of other households after April 2010 when a decree signed by 
President Preval declared 5,000 hectares to the north of Port-au-Prince ‘of public utility’ (Le Moniteur 
2010). This decree was intended to allow IDPs to come to live outside the city, where land pressure 
was intense and where rental prices increased a lot, squeezing out the poorest. This is a common 
phenomena in Haiti, where the poor rural people arrive in cities (rural exodus) that are not prepared 
to welcome them, which then create new precarious districts in or outside the city: slums that 
became “rurbanisation” districts. For example, in response to the question ‘where would you go if you 
had to leave the camp?’, 53% of IDPs in the camps within the city answered ‘I don’t know’ (OIM-Acted 
2011: 4). The area therefore appeared to offer a solution to many of the displaced following the 
closure of a number of camps in 2011 and 2012. The site, renamed Canaan after a place of worship 
that was located there, has since filled up, whilst the metropolitan area has become less congested. 
A few NGOs had operated in Canaan during the early stages, but they quickly withdrew once 
the emergency phase came to an end. They were waiting for the legal status of the site, which was 
contested by the owners who were seeking compensation, to be sorted out. Haiti’s land ownership 
system is highly complex and it is often hard to understand who owns a piece of land given the 
various historical and legal twists, both formal and informal, it has been subject to (Oriol, Dorner 
2012). Everyone was waiting for the government to give more indications as to its intentions for the 
area. Moreover, Canaan received groups of people who were often abandoned because they were 
very poor: the internally excluded whom Zygmunt Bauman has crudely described as ‘human waste’ 
(Bauman 2004). By way of example, two thirds of the inhabitants of Canaan interviewed during my 
fieldwork were born outside the capital and had migrated to Port-au-Prince at the time of the 
earthquake where they were living in precarious rental accommodation in shantytowns. Just under 
half had no identification documents –lost or not given by a corrupted and enfeebled administration-, 
which prevents them from having access to various aspects of citizenship such as administrative 
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procedures or care, and makes them stateless in their own country (Kaelin 2010), like the stateless 
‘outside the law’ (Arendt 1972: 253). Bearing in mind that it brings together some of the most 
excluded sectors of Haitian society, and that it was ignored by both NGOs and the government whilst 
it was growing, we can say that Canaan has been invisible to the authorities and humanitarian 
apparatus. Their attention was instead focused on the most central and visible of the camps, such as 
those in the wealthy areas or located in front of the presidential palace. Yet when at the end of 2012 
it was estimated that 54,045 people were living in one part of Canaan (DTM 2012), international 
observers put forward the figure of more than 150,000.Different neighbourhoods have grown up 
according to where the IDPs came from, as they often arrived together when a camp in the city was 
closed. The names of these areas are biblical, such as Canaan I, II, III, IV, V, Jerusalem and New 
Jerusalem, Village Grace de Dieu, etc., a reminder that Haiti is replete with religious references 
(Hurbon 2004) and that Canaan is also considered a ‘Promised land’ for the displaced. Indeed, a lot of 
churches lead faith-based market in Canaan, in order to develop their dominance on the area. One of 
the districts, which we will come back to later, is known as Mosaique Camp. 
The first people to arrive in Canaanestablished committees, as was often the case in the 
camps in the cities. Although they are supposed to be representative, these committees are often 
self-appointed. Their members manage a given space, dividing into various groups managing water, 
the environment, security, and so on. They create a local administration of the space and people, as 
“self made men” or “big men” (Médard 1992), has most of them had done before the earthquake on 
their previous environment. These committees have multiplied in camps where the early 
humanitarian interventions promoted the emergence of community leaders, who presented 
themselves to outside institutions as the camp’s main spokespersons, at the risk that –as in Corail– 
they fail to present the truth about the difficulties in the field. The heads of the committees in Canaan 
are often former leaders of districts in Port-au-Prince who command respect because of the 
sometimes violent control they exerted over their old territories. Such is the case of Manuel (a 
pseudonym), who heads one of the oldest areas of Canaan. After being abandoned by his parents 
when they migrated to the capital, he lived in the very poor and violent neighborhood of Cité Soleil, 
mixing with chimères, armed militias that sowed terror during the Aristide dictatorship. After the 
earthquake, he heard an acquaintance talk about Canaan and decided to go there in order to ‘leave 
the hell of Cité Soleil‘. Since March 2010, he has been organising the area and has jointly founded the 
associations that have grown up there. Although he did so as part of a strategy to create and preserve 
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his own personal power, he has since tried to manage the site just like a mayor concerned for the 
general welfare of his district –knowing that his success will guarantee his personal position. 
Like him, the other people in charge of the committees in Canaan appear to be aware of what 
is at stake in the creation of a new ‘ideal’ neighbourhood and its development. ‘We’ve organised 
ourselves so that we are strong. We decided to make peace with each other through the organisations 
so that we do not end up fighting’, said one leader. For example, in one of the areas, young men who 
‘caused problems’ were thrown out in order to maintain security. Manuel added ‘We do not want 
Canaan to become a ghetto like elsewhere. We are helping the state reduce the overcrowding in the 
city’ (interviews in September 2012). A Presidential Commission to Build Canaan has also been 
created, which each new arrival must pay money for collective infrastructure. These facilities have 
never been built, but the Commission has managed to impose its authority out of fear and the hope 
arising from its status. Moreover, in most of the neighbourhoods, the heads of the committees 
express suspicion about any external project, including any of the state’s, which was still absent from 
the site in 2013.This situation allows the leaders to protect their community, but also to manage their 
districts alone. They often stress their independence from humanitarian interventions: such a stance 
reassures them in the face of the feeling of rejection by the humanitarian presence in the country, 
which we will not go into here, but which is very widespread and can be summed up by the notion 
that ‘humanitarians get rich off our backs’. This independence also places a value on people’s dignity, 
which is often swept aside by projects done to the species-body, a power focused on man-as-species 
(Foucault 1997). Aid is accepted primarily when it comes from religious bodies, when it is one-off, and 
above all, when it can be controlled. But this independence is also a means, for some groups, to 
impose their authority and their control over certain markets that develop (particularly the rental 
market), and even to extend their network of influence with a view to furthering political ambitions. 
For competing groups headed by local strongmen, the emergence of Canaan is viewed as a new 
opportunity for territorial control. 
Canaan is therefore a place born of the gradual arrival of people who have come looking for a 
piece of land, a shelter and hope. As it has grown, the rental market has grown with it, as well as 
many food stores or construction depots, restaurants, and so on. Some infrastructure has been 
installed: electricity has been pirated from the road under the direction of local leaders as Manuel, 
increasing their popularity and enabling them to charge its users. Privately-managed water cisterns 
have been built, and roads have been marked out and named so that the water lorries can fill them. 
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Trees were distributed to the inhabitants in March 2011, and everyone was encouraged to plant food 
crops, providing some shade for the site. A private health centre, equipped with a scanner, has even 
been opened, even though it is too expensive for most of the local population. Churches with schools 
attached to them have sprung up. Religious leaders gain the loyalty of their flock, then start a private 
school to which the children of the faithful are sent, a scheme which ensures the religious leaders’ 
wealth, often at the expense of their parishioners and the quality of teaching (Hurbon 2004). 
While the site’s apparent anarchy seems hard to decode from an external viewpoint, the 
people in Canaan have nonetheless organised themselves in such a way as to create a coherent way 
of life. They have made sense of it and have made a production of locality (Appadurai 1996). To sum it 
up in a single phrase, the ‘community of condition’ cobbled together in Canaan, despite all its 
constraints, allows displaced people to muddle through and therefore take possession of the land in 
order to carry out their life projects. 
But only the wealthiest, who often have a stable job in the private sector, and who have been 
attracted by the space available in Canaan, have the means to live well there, by building a latrine, for 
instance. The remaining majority must work in the informal sector, starting small businesses on the 
spot or going back and forth to Port-au-Prince. Moreover, Canaan’s organisation makes up for the 
lack of any official structures. When Hurricane Isaac struck in 2012, the heads of the committees in 
Canaan took on the work of the commune of Croix-des-Bouquets by organising the distribution of 
first aid kits. Thus, the informal took over from the formal, with the latter able to reach in an 
emergency an area that is neglected the rest of the time. 
 
From the city to Canaan: the trajectory of Mosaique Camp 
 
The invasion of the land around Canaan and the sporadic cohesion that made it possible can 
be illustrated by the example of Cite Mosaique Camp. From the very evening of the disaster, some 
130 households whose homes had been destroyed in the commune of Delmas, the economic centre 
of greater Port-au-Prince, established themselves on a small space used as a football pitch. A leader 
took charge in what became known as ‘CitéMosaique’: the mosaic alluded to by its name was with 
respect to the diversity of people present on the site, while Cité, in Creole, means ‘ghetto’ or 
‘shantytown’.He had a water cistern built inside the camp, as well as some latrines and collective 
showers, and he interacted with a few NGOs that from time to time distributed treated water, 
medicines, etc. At the heart of the camp was a small space that became its social centre, recalling the 
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traditional lakou (areas of social life often located in the middle of plots belonging to families or 
groups of families).Thus, in Cite Mosaique, as in other spontaneous camps, ‘there was a strong 
determination on the part of the survivors[…].During the time they lived in make-shift shelters, they 
showed a great capacity for improvisation in terms of construction, how community life was organized 
and more generally in the survival strategies that were adopted ‘ (Davis 2012: 5). 
The example of the small Mosaique Camp demonstrates how IDPs organised themselves 
without any dependence on the state or international organisations. Solidarity was born out of 
necessity, and solidarity enabled survival. The precariousness of the situation they shared encouraged 
them to have a feeling of cohesion. But landownership pressures on the camp increased. Its internal 
climate deteriorated and the overcrowding gave rise to a squalid environment. In May 2012, all the 
shelters measured less than 15m² for households composed of an average of 8 people! Two children 
caught cholera. In the spring of 2012, the Delmas town council offered US$ 125 per family to get the 
IDPs to leave. Having heard about Canaan, an ‘Eldorado’ where, rumour had it, there was a chance of 
acquiring ownership, and having nowhere else to go, one group left for Canaan at the end of April, 
just before Cité Mosaique was violently evicted by militia working for a supposed landowner who 
wanted to recover this space in the middle of the city (Amnesty International 2013). Eventually, the 
new camp was built on the edge of Canaan, close to the national road leading to the north of the 
island. The chief surrounded the site with barbed wire, staked out an area for the shelters and 
another for a small football pitch, and cleared away the refuse from the former hospital waste 
disposal site on which the camp was built. That was how Mosaique Camp came into being (no longer 
‘Cite’), far off the beaten track, with only the proximity of the sea and the road running alongside it as 
assets. 
The camp committee, made up of 12 men and women, attempted to establish a micro-credit 
project. The 200 inhabitants all contributed towards getting water-trucks to come to fill the reservoir 
with (untreated) water for the camp. They bought a boat, and a fisherman was recruited to provide 
the inhabitants with fish. No school was set up because the necessary skills were not there: those 
who could, sent their children to Port-au-Prince to live with close relatives. After few months, they 
started to send them to the new schools of Canaan. But, as Camp Mosaique is in the margins of 
Canaan and because the road to go there is very long and difficult, the children mostly stayed in the 
camp, without any education. The camp population became overwhelmingly female and young, 
because the men worked in town during the week, and because the camps brought together the 
most vulnerable. Everyone else found alternatives ways out. So, in September 2012, Mosaique Camp 
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was half adult (about 10% of inhabitants were grown men and 40% women), and the other half was 
made up of young children under 12: 30% were aged between 6 and 12, and 20% from 0 to 5 years 
old. Most of the women had no work, and most of the households in the camp were eating only one 
meal a day. Despite their vulnerability and the precariousness of their situation, they tried to make 
improvements to their living space in order to gain more privacy and make it more resistant to the 
unceasing wind and frequently torrential rains. 
Because of their precarious situation, the initial solidarity that had been the key to better 
survival was not invested to the same extent in the camp’s common welfare: in Haiti, ‘individualism 
never finds its partner in the community’ (Labadie 2013). Not because individualism carries more 
weight, but because it is necessary in Haiti, where the idea of a ‘nation’ owes more to a pro-
independence reading of history than to a social body (Corbet, Groupe URD 2012). Tensions rose. For 
instance, some people did not accept that those who did not pay for water should have any, and the 
fishermen sold off their boats and disappeared. The chief had to manage these disagreements by 
‘playing’ on popular beliefs, notably by resting his authority on the belief in lougarous, evil night-time 
spirits that attack children in particular, and which would punish those who behave badly in the 
camp. As of mid-2013, Camp Mosaique still had a very poor and precarious existence. No one had 
been able to save enough to build a solid shelter. The inhabitants, despite their shared history, felt 
liable to be evicted at any moment. But they persisted in claiming the space, which has become their 
only life option, so that Mosaique Camp has become a new district of Canaan. 
 
From informal invasion to occupied land 
 
In spite of the differences in people’s situations in Canaan, the invasion of the land was based 
on individual and collective tactics for claiming the space: forming committees, fixing the boundaries 
of plots of land, building homes, looking after small gardens, dividing into districts. These forms of 
land invasion in Canaan, as is true of the way land has been developed, are not new in Haiti. Even the 
creation of shantytowns with an impetus from the state has happened many times before. Cité Soleil 
- initially known as Cite Simone, after the name of the wife of the former dictator François Duvalier - 
was created in this way. Similarly, Canaan is sometimes called Cité Sophia Martelly, after the name of 
the wife of the current President. Does that then mean it will be transformed into a shantytown? 
As it stands, Canaan is not simply an ‘incomplete, unfinished form of urbanity’ (Agier 2002b: 
337), it is above all an inchoate city-camp, floating between two states: between the town and the 
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camp, and between de facto autonomy and dependence on decisions about its status. Moreover, 
with time, this location, which had previously been neglected in the days when it was the infamous 
Titanyen, has become attractive, as it demonstrated by a few sumptuous villas that have been built 
by wealthy people who sense that the site might become a fully-fledged area of Port-au-Prince. 
Today, Canaan is therefore a potential town: a city in the making, a naked city (Agier 2002b), where 
people are living like in a normal Haitian town, but without any administrative consideration or urban 
planning from the authorities. A place where there is no regalian power, just the creations made by 
the invasion and the installation of the IDPs. 
After being occupied by people who came to live there in 2010 or more recently, as in the 
case of Mosaique Camp, the field study shows that Canaan is more than a spontaneous camp: it is a 
place of encampment. This means that the land there has been organised, given names and projected 
into the future, as with ‘urban dwellers in the making’ (Pérouse de Montclos, Kagwanja 2000: 206). 
Canaan is composed of a hotchpotch of different groups with varying objectives. Like a shantytown, it 
is a hybrid town made up of houses built with tarpaulins or cement. At best, Canaan may offer legal 
access to land ownership, and at the very least, the chance to rebuild a house or run a business for a 
certain amount of time. This huge informal camp is also seen to provide an opportunity for many of 
its inhabitants, which is why it has become much more about politics and urban development than 
humanitarianism. The international community has, moreover, started to ask questions about 
Canaan’s existence and future, encouraging the Haitian state to show some concern about what the 
site might become in the future. The state is in fact said to be engaged in reshaping Canaan, with 
plans for building basic infrastructure(Ayiti kale Je 2013).Even though the public utility area was 
created by presidential decree, these plans –still only on the drawing board– would result in the 
eviction (the deguerpissement) of many IDPs, who are considered ‘squatters’. Yet they are likely to 
rise up against the state taking over ‘their’ Canaan: ‘this is not a camp, it is where I live’, one of them 
said in September 2012. 
What will the future of Canaan be? For the Haitian government, the actual state of affairs will 
require regulation that will be all the more difficult to introduce since Canaan’s informality has 
allowed time for various actors to make their mark, particularly since it has allowed groups of people 
to introduce their lifestyle with complete autonomy and so will be difficult to curb. Some observers 
claim that the Canaan area (which has gradually expanded to include Corail) is already the largest 
shantytown in the greater Port-au-Prince area. This voluntary neglect is symptomatic of the usual 
‘laisser-faire’ of Haitian leaders. It is as if Canaan were ‘the physical embodiment of the national 
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reconstruction strategy based on self-build’ (Noël Groupe URD 2012: 5): a strategy that allows the 
forgotten part of the population to fend for itself –so long as they do not cause any problems. Yet 
Canaan’s lack of management also raises a security issue: it could become transformed into a 
shantytown blighted by the committees that might turn into gangs, or its inhabitants could rise up 
against the government’s plans. While waiting for a determination about his future, Canaan remains 
in a state of exception because it is invisible to the government and to NGOs and due to its unclear 
legal status and the uncertainty surrounding its future. Its inhabitants feel a strong sense of 
insecurity, which forces them to continue to muddle through day-by-day, even though they make 
some investments, such as strengthening their homes, thereby betting on the future. While it is still 
an informal settlement, Canaan is no longer a camp in people’s discourse, yet it continues to be one 
in terms of its precariousness. 
 
The identitarian background of informal encampment 
 
Corail’s planned space seems to have failed compared to Canaan, whose invasion is 
illustrative of the passage from the logic of a camp to one of population, resembling an urban genesis. 
The vast informal camp has seen the emergence of a shared awareness of belonging to the same 
place (or feeling of belonging): whose inhabitants now call themselves ‘Canaéens’, give names to the 
roads, go to churches, have shops... It is reasonable to put forward the idea of a sort of community of 
misfortune and condition brought about by the earthquake, which was the founding moment for 
Haitian camps. Since the disaster was very sudden, people were mixed up during the emergency 
period, particularly in camps. That moment still remains in Haitians’ discourse as one of the rare 
moments when all social classes came together (Corbet 2012). That equalisation of living conditions 
between what are generally impenetrable strata of Haitian society, even though it was only 
temporary, was one of the first elements contributing to the fiction of coherence that grew up after 
the earthquake. Since then, the memory of the camp’s founding has remained strong, even though 
the earthquake was not always the reason people moved there. There is therefore an identity-like 
affiliation, real or fictitious, to this ‘community of condition’. It allows the IDPs to make sense of their 
situation, sometimes demanding the government and NGOs’ attention by referring to this initial 
event, aware of their image as ‘absolute victims’ (Rancière 1995). According to several interviews 
carried out in the course of this study, the scattering of people that followed the closure of some 
camps and the sprinkling of housing solutions throughout the metropolitan area is a mistake. In 
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dispersing the camp’s population, their unity, which was the factor giving them coherence and which 
provided the basis for them to be able to build new ways of living together, has been taken away. 
However, this form of solidarity cannot be considered the same as a ‘community’ in the sense 
often used by humanitarian organisations, which define it according to spatial criteria, making it 
synonymous with a shared identity. It is too restricted in time and it does not show in the daily life of 
the camp, where individualism takes precedence despite belonging to the same place. Yet 
nonetheless this ‘community of condition’ calls into question the camp as a place defined by its 
history, like a partial community spirit. There is a process of belonging in the claims made by 
displaced of living in a camp that links their personal history with the collective one (Malkki 1995). 
Like a small entities who are linked by  « these territoriality links find their expression in production 
and commercialization as well as in cultural and social activities"2 : relatives, neighbours, people 
engaged in economic interdependence (Anglade 1974: 211)… 
In other words, the earthquake provides a strong liminal reference point that legitimates their 
presence in the camp and their right to ‘own’ it. It can also allow room for fending for oneself and for 
autonomy. Concretely, this is expressed through an architectural transition: tarpaulins give way to 
cement. People or groups of people who were strangers at the beginning, have started to come 
together in economic, social and friendship networks: moun pa. In Canaan, for example, the displaced 
Haitians have created order out of the initial disorder. They no longer always need to leave the camp, 
which increasingly provides employment solutions and is dotted with small shops, churches and 
schools. Even though still set apart, Canaan is Foucault’s heterotopia incarnate and has become 
inhabited. It is not a situation of exclusion, in a camp where they cannot live by themselves, but a 
“rurbanisation” process. It is an incarnation of the prediction of Anglade who shows that slums are 
the future of Port-au-Prince, because this is where life and dynamics can be developed, without the 
restrictive governmental regulation (Anglade 1991, cited by Duval 2013). 
The contrast with Corail is stark, where only the bare bones of the informal town-dwelling 
that is to be found in Canaan can be observed. Yet it is there that the basic infrastructure lacking in 
Canaan is to be found: latrines, water for all, etc. But even if, from a distance, the T-shelters give the 
impression of a multi-coloured village –albeit one that is laid out in straight lines–Corail remains in a 
state of complete indecision and its inhabitants are ‘stuck’ in the formal camp. They have been cut off 
by the humanitarian apparatus, which has deprived them of the means of ‘owning’ the land, of 
                                                 
2
 Translated from french by the author: « Ces liens de territorialité qui s'expriment autant au niveau de la 
production et de la commercialisation qu'au niveau des activités sociales et culturelles ». 
19 
 
standing together and creating forms of solidarity that enable them to become organised. Hence the 
Corail IDPs remain in a state of dependence due to the uncertainty surrounding the fate of the place 
where they live, without the ability to organise it in the meantime. They must, moreover, leave the 
camp in order to be able to subsist in the camp. Yet, rather than living a bare life, they have 
challenged the humanitarian apparatus that has denied their emergence as political beings. But 
because of Corail’s rigid ‘camp shape’ they have not been able to build a coherent living space as in 
Canaan. The ‘community of condition’ that is visible in Canaan –even if it is sporadic and 
opportunistic– has been undermined in Corail by the humanitarian apparatus. By insisting on a 
‘community’ that is believed to be created through the process of setting up a camp, and which is 
supposed to be needy but willing, and in imposing its management over the species-body, the 
humanitarian apparatus has increased the fragmentation, even leading to competition, among its 
inhabitants. This can be summed up, from an internal point of view, by saying that in Corail, the 
humanitarian logic has gone against the camp. 
These examples remind us that the history of the camp is one of a multitude of personal 
histories, of the way its inhabitants put effort into the camp or fail to do so, and the adaptability or 
not of the humanitarian apparatus. Over and above the non-place (Augé 1992) and even the off-site 
(‘hors lieux’ Agier 2002b, 2012), the camp should therefore be analysed beyond the logistics of its 
creation and its pure material existence. It is a place that evolves over time, constantly being 
reshaped, whose inhabitants try to build a future for themselves rather than staying in a temporary 
state that is particular to camps. Camps therefore deserve to be seen as central places at the heart of 
strategies of space, power and identity - places where people from the ‘country beyond’ (the 
mounsayo, i.e. the peasants and, by extension, all of the very poor (Barthélémy 1990)), whose hidden 
presence has become visible, are inserted into urban life. Although the inhabitants of Canaan, for 
instance, remain in a state of exception, abandoned by the government in particular, and even 
though the area is peripheral, located in-between two liminal states (Von Gennep 1909), the site 
nonetheless resembles a space at the heart of an urban and social construction. What makes the 
Canaan model attractive is the cohesiveness of its community and the possibilities that exist there. 
The site allows investments to be made there, unlike Corail. Thus, one type of camp absorbs another. 
Being drawn together by the ‘community of naked condition’ has become a means of protection from 
land ownership challenges and of opening up opportunities, despite the precariousness and 
vulnerability of its population. It is a way of constructing ‘my place’ and of defending ‘our place’. Yet it 
is in relation to the other and through sharing –whatever it may be– that citizenship is defined 
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(Balibar 2004). Have not the excluded people of Canaan found a new life for themselves in forms of 
citizenship which, in a formal camp, have been blocked by the humanitarian apparatus? 
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